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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
7701

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD ·COM·PANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Oregon Short Line Railroad Company will be referred to throughout this brief as the "Short Line"; the
Union P·acific Railroad Company, as "Union Pacific"; The
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, as "Rio
Grande"; and italics and other emphasis throughout is
supplied by the writer of this brief, unless otherwise noted.
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Except for the statement contained in the first two
paragraphs at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2
of appellant's brief, respondent disagrees with the facts as
stated by appellant; or, more particularly, it might be said
that appellant has misstated some of the facts and has
stated as facts conclusions that are not warranted by the
pleadings or evidence in the case. Therefore, except for
adopting said first two paragraphs, respondent will give a
further statement of facts involved in this case.
The Oregon Short Line Railroad Company is a Utah
corporation which owns a line of railroad, which, insofar as
may be material in this case, extends from McCammon,
Idaho, to Sandy, Utah (R. 16·6). In addition to its roadbed and terminals, and contrary to the claim of appeHant
throughout the case, the Short Line does at the present
time (or as of April 1, 19'51) own rolling stock, including
something in excess of 2,000 freight cars, a little less than
100 passenger cars, and 134 locomotive engines (R. 122125; Ex. W, X, Y, and AA).
Although the Short Line has been in existence as a
railroad corporation for a considerable period in excess
of fifty years (Ex. A) and has opera ted as such through
the states of Utah and Idaho and elsewhere, nevertheless
it did, under the effective date of January 1, 1936, lease
its entire railroad properties to the Union Pacific Railroad
Company (Ex. C). That lease is now in force and effect
and has not been terminated in any way (R. 86). Appellant stated that the lease was for one hundred years but
the evidence shows the contrary. The lease itself (Ex. C)
provides (Sec. 8, page 8) :
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''8.

TERM O·F LEASE

"This lease shall become effective on the first
day of January, 1936, and shall continue in effect
until December 31, 1936, and from year to year
thereafter until terminated by either party, by at
least three months' notice in writing of its election
to terminate the same at the end of the calendar
year then current, and either party shall have the
right to terminate this lease as aforesaid. This lease
and the provisions of the several sections hereof
shall be construed as if, for each year, a separate
lease was made and entered into containing the provisions hereof, but only for the fixed term of one
year, and all of the payments to be made by Lessee
under any of the several sections of this lease shall
constitute rental for the year in which the Lessee
shall become obligated to make the same."
Thus, the lease is nothing more than a year-to-year lease
subject to termination at any time by either party by the
giving of three months' notice.
Said lease further provides (Sec. 5, page 5) :

"* * * The Lessee assumes and agrees to
perform and observe all obligations of the Lessor
under any and all leases, trackage contracts, franchises, ordinances, easements, licenses and other contracts demised, assigned and transferred to the Lessee by this lease, or to which the demised premises
or any part thereof may be subject; provided that
all expenditures by the Lessee in performance of
any of the aforesaid obligations which are chargeable to investment accounts shall be charged to and
reimbursed by the Lessor, and that any moneys or
other considerations received by the Lessee under
any of said leases and contracts which are properly
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creditable to investment accounts shall inure to and
become the property of the Lessor."

*

*

*

*

*

"The Lessee agrees to operate the demised premis·es and to maintain the same in a proper state of
repair, and to bear all cost and expense thereof
chargeable to operating expenses. * * *"
With specific reference to additions or betterments,
new trackage or other improvements on the railroad, with
specific reference to condemnation as is involved in this
case, the lease provides :
"The Lessee shall have the right to construct or
acquire any additions to and betterments or extensions of the demised premises which it may deem
desirable in the interest of the demised premises
as a whole or advantageous in the operation thereof.
All such additions, betterments and extensions made
upon or to any part of the demised premises owned
by the Lessor shall become and be a part of the
demised premises and the property of the Lessor
and the Lessor shall reimburse the Lessee to the
extent of the cost incurred by it therefor chargeable
to property investment accounts. Upon the request
of the Lessee, from time to time, the Lessor will,
to the extent of its rights and powers, permit to be
instituted and prosecuted in its name proceedings
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain or
otherwise for the acquisition of additional property,
rights of way, rights to cross, intersect or connect
with other railroads, * * * or public highways,
which shall be deemed necessary or desirable for the
purpose of additions to or betterments or extensions
of the demised premises. * * * For the purpose
of reimbursing the Lessee for the cost of additions
to and betterments and extensions of the demised
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premises chargeable to the Lessor, less credits upon
abandonment, retirement, destruction and sales of
property, under the foregoing provisions of this article, the Lessor, from time to time during the term
of this lease, '\viii, subject to any necessary governmental approval, upon request of the Lessee, make,
execute, issue and deliver to the Lessee in such
amounts as may be necessary for the purpose aforesaid bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness,
as the Lessee shall elect, bearing such rates of interest and payable at such times as. the parties hereto
shall determine, and, if so requested by the Lessee,
secured by mortgage upon the demised premises or
any part thereof."
On page 3 of his brief counsel for the appellant states
that the Short Line has no other officers, agents or employes "excepting only F. ·C. Paulsen * * * who is
* * * general manager · * * * but whose sole function as such has been and is the signing of leases for the
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company." Counsel does not
state the facts or the record properly. The evidence concerning Mr. Paulsen is that he is General Manager of the
Union Pacific, as well as the Oregon Short Line, properties
within the State of Utah and the designation as general
manager in and of itself would indicate that he would have
such rights and duties as normally would be exercised· by
any general manager. Counsel for appellant attempted to
infer by his questionings of the witnesses that as general
manager he had nothing to do, but the only testimony with
respect thereto was that of Mr. Bachman, who stated with
respect to his duties, "Primarily it is to execute leases and
contracts on behalf of the corporate property, the corporate
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company,1 the Short Line" ( R. 87) . This testimony, in spite
of what counsel made an attempt to infer from it, does not
say that that was his "sole function". With respect to
other officers, contrary to what appellant states on page
3, the Short Line does have other officers. Arthur E.
Stoddard is President of the Short Line and Ambrose J.
Seitz is Vice-President of the Short Line (R. 82, 83). E.
G. Smith is Secretary of the Short Line, as well as Secretary of the Union Pacific (R. 101). Thus, the testimony
is without dispute that the Short L~ine does have other officers, including not only the ones referred to but also including a board of directors, which is active in the conduct
and management of the affairs of the Short Line, as shown
by Exhibit F.
·Counsel for appellant has made several conclusions
which we do not think are warranted· by the evidence, and
then has taken such conclusions as a premise to argue from
and thereby, in our opinion, entirely confuses or attempts
to confuse the issue in this case. On page 2· of his brief he
states, first, that the Short Line is a Utah corporation and
then, as a conclusion, states, "but that it has not operated
as a common carrier in any particular since January 1,
1936." Again, on page 3 of his brief ·he states, "Since
January 1, 1936, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company
has not carried any freight or passengers or engaged in
any activities whatever as a common carrier". In his statement of points, paragraph 1, at the bottom of page 3, he
states that the court should have found that it "has not
been since January 1, 1936, engaged as a common carrier".
Then, on page 4 of his brief, counsel states a conclusion as
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a single question of law and the "point upon which appellant relies for reversal of judgment" that "a corporation
does not have the power of eminent domain as a railroad
corporation under Utah lavv unless it is engaged as a common carrier". This is appellant's premise, and is a false
premise and counsel does not anywhere throughout the
entire course of his brief cite even one case to support
such a proposition.
Under this "point upon which appellant relies" counsel
states three propositions for argument. We will answer
the three points as set out in counsel's argument to the
extent that we feel they must necessarily be answered but,
in addition to the three points posed for argument by counsel, we wish to set forth a fourth point for argument which,
in our opinion, is the main issue in the case and which is
the one issue which counsel has stressed from the first day
pleadings were filed in the case, regardless of his present
attempt to becloud the issues, and that point, or main issue,
is: Does a railroad corporation, lawfully incorporated
under the laws of the state and which has operated railroad
properties and has operated a railroad as such for many
years, cease to be a railroad or a railroad corporation by
virtue of leasing its properties to another railroad and
does it by such lease cease to have the power or authority
to exercise eminent domain under the laws of the State
of Utah? Respondent contends and will argue, to the point
that the plaintiff and respondent by virtue of its lease to
Union Pacific did not lose its right to prosecute condemnation and that plaintiff and respondent as it is presently circumstanced is authorized to prosecute this action in con-
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demnation within the State of Utah. Incidental thereto and
by way of answer to other points raised by appellant, respondent does and will continue to insist that the Short
Line is a common carrier, although being a common carrier is not one of the requisites. necessary to entitle it to
eminent domain under the Utah law.
STATEMENT OF POINTS FOR ARGUMENT

I.
A CORPORATION DOES NOT BECOME A
COMMON CARRIER BY LEGSLAT'IVE FIAT,
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER OR
PROVISIONS OF ITS CHARTER. IT MUST
HAVE THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH IN LAW
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE STAT·US OF A
COMMON CARRIER. BUT UTAH LAW DOES
NOT REQUIRE A CORPORATION TO BE A
COMMON CARRIER TO ENTITLE IT TO
BRING AND PROSECUTE CONDEMNATION
PROCEEDINGS.
II.
UNDER THE UTAH STATUTES AND CASES
THE TAKING MUST BE FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE.
III.
A RAILROAD COMPANY CANNOT CONDEMN
LAND FOR USES NOT CONNECTED WITH
THE CONDUCT OF ITS BUSINESS OR REMOTE FROM PROPERTIES OWNED BY IT.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

IV.
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT BY LEASING
ITS PROPERTIES TO THE UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY DID NOT LOSE ITS
RIGHT TO CONDEMN, AND PLAINTIFF AND
RESPONDENT DOES HAVE POWER AND
AUTHORITY TO BRING AND PROSECUTE
THIS CONDEMNATION ACTION.

ARGUMENT

I.
A CORPORATION DOES NOT BECOME A
COMMON CARRIER BY LEGSLATIVE FIAT,
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER OR
PROVISIONS OF ITS CHARTER. IT MUST
HAVE THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH IN LAW
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE STAT·us OF A
COMMON CARRIER. BUT UTAH LAW DOES
NOT REQUIRE A CORPORATION TO BE A
COMMON CARRIER TO ENTITLE IT TO
BRING AND PROSECUTE CONDEMNATION
PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent will agree with .the first sentence of appellant's first point, which is that a corporation does not
become a common carrier by legislative fiat, public service
commission order or by provisions of its charter. The only
thing we would answer to such an argument is, "So what."
The right of eminent domain under the Utah laws is not
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given to common carriers, and the appellant is wrong in
assuming that the question of whether a corporation is or is
not a common carrier is a prerequisite or something that
must be shown as a basis to entitle it to condemnation, and
none of the cases. cited by counsel states, or even tends to
support, such a proposition. Therefore, we must disagree
with the second sentence of appellant's first point of argument if appellant ~contends that a corporation must be a
common carrier to entitle it to condemnation. We will agree
that neither a corporation nor an individual can be either in
law or in fact a common carrier unless such corporation or
individual holds itself or himself out to the public as. being
willing to undertake for hire to transport persons or commodities generally for the entire public, or has been so
engaged in trans.porting and holding out to transport for the
pubic generally. The case of McCarthy v. Publc Service
Commission, 111 Utah 481, 184 P. 2d 220, had no reference
whatsoever to condemnation but merely held that neither
the public service commission nor anyone else could de·clare
a person (including corporation in such designation as person) to be a common carrier as a result of past performances. unless he had actually transported for the public generally and held himself out to transport for the public
generally. When there has been no past performan0e showing such a person to be a common carrier, the court stated
that a need would have to be shown from which the commission could find public convenience and necessity for such
a person or corporation to offer his or its services and hold
out to the public to transport generally. Again, we say
there was. no_ question of condemnation but merely the point
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that a common carrier is one who holds. himself out to carry
generally for the public or who is engaged in a general public service, with the right of the public to use his facilities.
The case of State v. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, 238 P. 237,
goes to the same point and involves merely a question as to
whether there was sho,vn in the case the element of public
service necessary to show that Nelson, who was charged with
being a common carrier, was serving and carrying all persons indiscriminately or indifferently who had applied for
transportaton. Nelson, not having held himself out or engaged in such business, was not a common carrier.
The case of Garkane Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 98 Utah 466, 100 P. 2d 571, is to the same e.ffect,
and the power company involved in that case was. held not
to be subject to the commission's jurisdiction because "it
does not propose to servi·ce the public generally but only to
serve its members."
We assume that counsel ·cited or intended to cite and
quote from these cases in an attempt to show that the
Short Line does not hold itself out to serve the public
generally or does. not serve the public generally and therefore is not a common carrier. Appellant must still show the
connection and show wherein it is necessary, under the laws
of the State of Utah, to be a common carrier to entitle one
to prosecute an action in condemnation, but this respondent
did not in any manner show.
While we admit the statement that a corporation does
not become a common carrier by legislative fiat, public
service commisson order or by provisions of its charter, we
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think that a different rule would apply with respect to a
constitutional provision, and we also wish to point out in
this case that both by our constitution and by statutes in the
State of Utah railroads are placed in a somewhat different
category than other corporations, both with respect to general law and to the laws governing eminent domain. By the
very grant of its ~corporate ·charter a railroad corporation
has imposed upon it certain duties. and responsibilities which
continue to be duties and obligatons of such ralroad corporation as long as it continues to be a corporation, regardless of
whether it leases its. properties to some other company for
operation or not, and, different from other corporations,
railroad corporations are declared by our Utah Constitution
to be common carriers and all properties·. and franchises
owned and held by them within the state must be at all times
kept available to perform common carrier se·rvice, whether
by the railroad corppration which owns the property or by
another who operates it as agent or contractor. Elliott on
Railroads, Third Edition, Section 2, page 6, states with respect to railroads:

"* * * They are now usually organized under general laws. They are given certain perogative
franchises and privileges for public purposes in return for which the state retains. a right of supervision
and control, in excess of that exercised over purely
private corporations. In the very grant of the franchise there is, in effect, an implied condition that it
shall be held as a public or quasi public trust * * *."
Section 43, page 75:
"Railroads, by whomsoever constructed or owned or operated, are quasi public works and are often
likened by the courts and writers to public highways.
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The constitution and laws of some states declare
them to be public highways ; those of others declare
the companies to be common carriers whose roads are
available to all persons for the transportation of
themselves and their property. This latter definition expresses most nearly the relation of a completed railroad to the public."
Section 12 of Article XII of the Constitution of the
State of Utah provides :
"All railroad and other transportation companies are declared to be common carriers, and subject to legislative control; * * *"
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution of the State
of Utah provides:
"No corporation shall lease or alienate any franchise, so as to relieve the franchise or property held
thereunder from the liabilities of the lessor, or
grantor, lessee, or grantee, contracted or incurred in
operation, use or enjoyment of such franchise or
any of its privileges."

Whitman v. Northern Central Railway Co. (Md.), 127
A. 112. In this case the appellate court of Maryland had
before it directly, as one of the main points of appeal, the
question as to whether or not the Northern Central, which
had leased all of its properties, to the Pennsylvania Railroad
Company, was or could be considered as a common carrier.
The case was not a condemnation case but did involve directly the question as~ to whether or not such a lessor railroad
continued, nevertheless, to be a common carrier. The opinion
states:
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"In 1914 the Northern Central Railway Company leased that entire system to the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company for 999 years. * * *"
The lease in question had many provisions similar to the
lease involved in this. case. We quote from the opinion, after
the recital of the facts :
"Upon these facts, the appellant contends: First,
that the appellee is not a carrier * * *
"The contention that the appellee is not a carrier is based upon the theory that since under the
lease the actual work of transporting persons and
property is. performed by the lessee, the lessor has
lost its status. as a carrier. But we think that contention involves too narrow a construction of the
word 'carrier'; for while the lessee does perform
the actual work of transportation over the leased
syste·m of railroads, the lessor still has important
duties and functions to perform in connection with
that transportation in which the public ·has. a vital
and immediate interest and which are necessarily
predicated upon and assume its continued status as
a carrier. Under the terms of the lease it has. the
right, and under the laws of the state it is charged
with the duty, of requiring the lessee to maintain
the leas.ed property in such a condition as may be
necessary to enable it to render adequate and efficient service to the public, and also to require that
the lessee during the continuance of the lease manage and operate the leased property in the same
manner as. the lessor 'is now or shall and may at any
time hereafter, be required by law to do.' * * *
It was originally chartered as a carrier, it was organized as a carrier, until the lease referred to it operated a railroad system as a carrier, it is· still required
to discharge many duties as a carrier, it is now
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orga.ni.zed to net as a carrier, and in the event of
default on the part of its lessee it must again actively operate its railroad system as a carrier. Under
those circunzstances, it remains no~o, as it originally
was, a common carrier."
The Supreme Court of the United States has likewise
so held. North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zackary, 232 U. S. 248,
58 L. Ed. 591, 34 S. Ct. 305. This case involved damages for
the death of an employe and the question was whether or
not the railroad company was subject to the Federal Employers' Liability Act as a common carrier in interstate
commerce. In that case the Supreme Court of the United
States pointed out that under North Carolina Law"* * *
a railroad corporation cannot evade its public duty and
responsibility by leasing its road to another corporation
* * *." Such holding is rather uniformly followed by
most of the states, and we are certain that the provisions
of Section 7 of Article XII of the Utah Constitution would
require a similar holding with respect to the Short Line
Company.
In the Zachary case, the defendant North Carolina R.
R. Co. was an intrastate railroad. However, all of its lines
were leased and operated by the Southern Railway Company
under a lease executed in 1909. The North Carolina courts
held that the case was not within the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, and the United States Supreme Court stated:
"It is not disputed that if the provisions of the
Federal act had been applied, the result of the action
might have been different."
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The defendant had contended throughout "that at the
time of the occurrence in question defendant, through its
lessee, was a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce. * * *." The U. S. Supreme Court held:
"In order to bring the case within the terms of
the Federal act (35 Stat. 65, c. 149, printed in full
in 223 U. S., p. 6), defendant must have been, at
the time of the occurrence in question, engaged as a
common carrier in interstate commerce, and plaintiff's intestate must have been employed by said
carrier in such commerce. If these facts appeared,
the Federal act governed, to the exclusion of the
statutes of the State. * * *"
The Supreme Court referred to the fact that the North
Carolina court had based its decision, among other reasons,
upon the ground "that the corporation itself is not, although
its lessee is, engaged in interstate commerce * * *."The
United States Supreme Court held that the state court erred
in holding that the Federal Employers' Liability Act had no
application and reversed theN orth Carolina Supreme Court,
stating:
"* * * although a railroad lease as between the parties may have the force and effect of
an ordinary lease, yet with respect to the railroad
operations conducted under it, and everything that
relates to the performance of the public duties assumed by the lessor under its charter, such a leasecertainly so far as concerns the rights of third parties, including employees as well as patrons-constitutes the lessee the lessor's substitute or agent,
so that for whatever the lessee does or fails to do,
whether in interstate or in intrastate commerce, the
lessor is responsible. This being the legal situation

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
under the l~al law, it seems to us that it must and
does result, in the case before us, that the lessor is a
'common carrier by railroad engaging in commerce
between the States.' * * *"
\Ve confidently assert that under the foregoing authorities, including our constitutional provisions, there is no
escape from the conclusion that the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company is at this date and at the present time a
common carrier, although its duties and responsibilities as
such common carrier and the transportation which makes it
a common carrier are being carried on for it by its lessee as
its "substitute or agent," pursuant to the contract of lease
entered into January 1, 1936.
A case which we think is interesting and enlightening
upon this entire subject is the case of Lake Superior &
Mississippi R. R. Co. v. United States, 93 U. S. 442, 23 L.
Ed. 965. An act of Congress in making a land grant for
railroads provided that the United States. should have free
use of the railroad as a public highway "free from all tolls
or other charge for transportation of its property or troops."
The question arose as to whether the word "railroad" included rolling stock, so that no charge could be made for
actual transportation, or whether the government could be
charged for use of rolling stock if it did not have its own to
move over the road. The railroad company transported goods
and troops for the government and then went into the Court
of Claims to ask for reasonable compensation therefor. The
Court of Claims decided against the railroad company but the
judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The Supreme Court gave a considerable recital of
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the history of railroads and a. comparison of railroads with
toll roads, turnpikes and canals. The court said:
"It is undoubtedly familiar to most of those whose
recollection goes back to that period, that railroads
were generally expected to be general highways upon
which every man who could procure the proper carriages and apparatuses would have the right to
travel."
It was stated that some early laws concerning railroads
provided that the company should have power to prescribe
the kind of carriage to be used on its road, by whom and
whether to be propelled by steam or other power. With respect to the act of Congress, the United States Supreme
Court also said :
"All that the act reserves is the free use of the
railroad. Of course, this implies also the free use of
all fixtures and appurtenances forming part of the
road and which are essential to its practical use,
such as turn tables, swikhes, depots and other neeessary appendages * * * "

,1,

"Equally untenable is the idea that, because railroads are not ordinarily used as public highways,
therefore the appellation of 'public highways' when
given to them must mean something different from
what it has ever meant before, and must embrace the
rolling stock with which they are operated and used.
Such a method of interpretation would set us all at
sea, and would invest the courts with the power of
making contracts, instead of the parties to them.
* * * Where, as in the laws. under review the
railroad is referred to throughout in its character as
a road, as a permanent structure, and designated and
required to be a 'public highway,' it cannot, without
doing violence to the language, and disregarding the
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long established useage of legislative expression, as
shown in the previous part of this opinion, be e~
tended to embrace the rolling stock or other personal
property of the railroad company."
The decree of the Court of Claims was reversed and a
new decree directed allowing compensation for the transportation.

United States v. Union Stockyards Co., 161 F. 919. The
defendant Union Stockyards Company was charged, under
the acts of Congress, with violation of the safety appliance
acts because it transported over its railways. and roadbed a
locomotive and engine with defective couplers. The defendant contended that it was not a railroad and not a common
carrier and therefore not subject to the safety appliance
acts. The defendant owned about 35 miles of trackage and
roadbed in and around the Omaha stockyards, connecting
with various railroads and with livestock pens and packing
houses. The defendant had a few locomotives of its own and
operated them upon the tracks. It had 3 flatcars used for
handling refuse and cinders over its own tracks. and 1 boxcar used as a tool storage car. "None of these cars. are
(were) carried beyond the defendant's premises." The
defendant handled with its locomotives cars of all kinds from
all railroads into the slaughter pens and other yards, packing plants and hauled both loaded and empty cars out.
"Over the 35 miles of track of the defendant is
handled all the live stock consigned to commission
agents and others who supply the 5 meat packing
houses of South Omaha, one of the greatest centers
of that industry in the United States * * *. The
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live stock handled over defendant's road amounts to
about 625 cars per day."
With respect to freight rates and tariffs, the Federal
Court stated :

"* * * The ~efendant quotes no rates for
the carriage of freight, whether live stock or dead
freight, but collects all of the freight charges. on incoming live stock, when not prepaid, as an accommodation to the railroad companies, and it pays this
amount over weekly to the railroad companies. The
defendant collects no freight charges on outgoing
live stock or dead freight. The charges of the defendant to the railroad companies for service rendered
the railroad companies are paid for by the railroad
company requesting the service to be performe~.
These charges are fixed and defini~e, under a contract with the railroad companies. The charges for
taking in empty cars. and taking out loaded cars are
always the same, and these charges are not fixed
with reference to the distance outgoing freight is to
be carried or incoming freight has been carried, but
are simply arbitrary charges fixed by the contract
between the railroad companies and the defendant.
Defendant does not join with any of the railroad
companies in fixing the amount of charges for carrying freight out of the yards to points outside of the
yards, nor as to freight carried from outside of the
defendant's yards, into its. yards, nor does the defendant join with any railroad company in making any
tariff charges for the carriage of freight at all, nor
does it receive any portion of the money due from
freight bills for carrying freight in or out of the
defendant's yards. * * *. The charges made for
handling the cars in the method above described are
arbitrarily fixed at 50 cents, $1, and $2 per car.

* * *
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··The defendant contends that it is not subject to
the (safety appliance) acts * * * that it is, not
a common carrier and is not engaged in interstate
commerce by railroad. * * *
"A railroad has been defined as a road or way
on which iron rails are laid for wheels to run on for
the conveyance of heavy loads and vehicles * * *
Such a track is a railroad independently of the use
made of the track in the hauling of cars over it, as
was pointed out in L. S. & M. R. Co. v. U. S., 93 U.
S. 442, 23 L. Ed. 965.
"In this case the road is not a mere switch maintained for the private purpose of the defendant, nor
are cars delivered to the consignees when they are
set upon the transfer track, and therefore an essential part of the transportation of the cars and
freight therein contained is unfinished.- * * *"

"* * * The defendant, having chosen to devote its railroad tracks to a public use, must be held
to be a common carrier. * * *"
Thus, in this ,case the stockyards company was held to
be both a railroad and a common carrier.
We would like at this point also to refer the court and
counsel to a fact which we think is common knowledge, and
that is that the American Express Company is held to be
a common carrier, although the trans.portation of express
and merchandise for such express company is performed for
it under contract by various railroads throughout the United
States.
We confidently assert that the plaintiff and respondent
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company is a common carrier.
However, we think that as far as the condemnation action
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involved herein is concerned, the collateral question as to
whether or not the respondent is a common carrier is immaterial and is nort properly an issue upon which it was
necessary for the court to make any finding. It is true that
the plaintiff alleged in its complaint for condemnation that
it was a common carrier. That allegation, we think, was immaterial. The complaint also stated that plaintiff was a
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the State of Utah as a railroad corporation, and
we think that the evidence is conclusive to prove such allegation.
In connection with this point of argument, we wish to
refer to the Utah law with respect to eminent domain. Chapter 61 of Title 104, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is the general
statute with respect to eminent domain. The first section
in that chapter sets forth the uses for which eminent domain
may be prosecuted. We would like to call the court's attention to the fact that the power of eminent domain by said
Chaper 61 is not given to any "common carrier." It is not
given to any corporation, association, or individual as such,
but that law states that "the right of eminent domain may
be exercised in behalf of the following public uses," and then
follows 14 subparagraphs setting forth various "public
uses" for which eminent domain may be exercised, and in
not one single instance is that right under said Chapter
61 given to any individual or to any corporation or other
entity in any respect.
The statute says : The power "may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses." Exercised by whom? By
any one who can show a proper public use. IT IS THE
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PROPER PUBLIC USE AND NOT T'HE INDIVIDUAL
OR CORPORATION OR OTHER ENTITY SEEKING TO
CONDEMN WHICH IS IMPORTANT UNDER THIS
STATUTE. A public use for which eminent domain may be
exercised under that statute, as specified, is: " ( 4) * * *
railroads * * * for public transportation." That does
not say that it is given to a railroad corporation (as Section
77-0-5 does) , nor that it is given to a railroad company or
any transportation company which may prove that it is a
common carrier, but the right of eminent domain may be
exercised for the use of or to provide "railroads * * *
for public transportation." The industrial track which plaintiff is seeking to extend into the area involved in this action
is a "railroad" to be used for "pu'blic transportation." There
are numerous cases holding that such a spur or industrial
track is a part of a ''railroad,'' and comes within the designation or definition of "railroad" under such a statute. Therefore, the use sought by plaintiff and respondent in this action
is a use authorized by said Chapter 61 and the question as
to whether plaintiff is a common carrier is entirely beside
the point and begs the issue.

We call attention to the other subsections of section 1,
Chapter 61. Even with counties and other municipal bodies,
Chapter 61 does not give the right of eminent domain to the
county or city, but the right of eminent domain may be exercised for "public buildings and grounds for the use of
any county, city or incorporated town, etc." With mining
companies, the right of eminent domain is not given to the
mining ·companies as such, but under subsection 6 the right
is given for roads, railroads, tram·ways, etc., to facilitate
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the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores or the working of mines, etc. These references to our statute show the
theory upon which the law of eminent domain rests, and as
was said in the case of Denver R. L. & C. Co. v. Union Pacific
R. R. Co., 34 F. 386:
"It is the object to which the land is to be devoted and not the party claiming the right to take
land, that is required to be public."
Again, in the same case :
"The inquiry is not as to what the company was
organized for, or whether it will be a private or public corporation, but what the road will be,-the structure its.elf,-if any such thing shall be_ made. * * *
It may be a question of inquiry to be determined as
matter of fact, whether the road, when built, will be
a public or private road, and the question will be the
same whether the road shall be built by a corporation
or by an individual. That question does not in any
way appertain to the other, by whom the road is
built. It is a question what the road itself is, not as
to the character, or the quality of the builder.

* * * "
Thus, again we say that while we do not agree with counsel
in his charge that the respondent is not a common carrier,

AND WE ASSERT· T'HAT IT IS A CO·MMON ;CARRIER,
we nevertheless urge that under our eminent domain law
the question of whether plaintiff and respondent is or is
not a common carrier is immaterial.
With respect to this action, different than may be true
in cases involving mines, irrigation projects, logging roads
or otherwise, we have a separate statute particularly ap-
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plying to railroads. That is why earlier in this brief we
stated that railroads, by virtue of our constitution and
laws in this state, are somewhat in a class by then1selves.
Section 77-0-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides:

"'Every railroad corporation org~anized under
the la·ws of this state shall, except as otherwise provided in this title and subject to the limitations and
requirements hereof, have all the rights, privileges
and powers, and be subject to all the duties and
obligations, of corporations organized for pecuniary
profit, and in addition thereto such railroad corrpo~
ration shall have the following p~owers:

*

*

*

*

*

"(3) To enter by its servants upon the real
property of any person for the purpose of selecting
an advantageous route for its main line or any extension or branch thereof, or for the purpose of relocating the same, subject to responsibility for all
damages resulting therefrom; and to condemn in
the manner required by law a right of way * * *."
Thus, in addition to what is provided by the general law
with respect to eminent domain, our statutes provide that
every railroad corporation organized under the laws of this
state shall have the power to condemn property for a right
of way.
It cannot be disputed that the Short Line is a "railroad corporation organized under the laws of this state".
And, as is shown by Exhibit A, it was such a corporation
certified to be in good standing by the Secretary of State
of the State of Utah at approximately the date of commencement of trial herein. As such, neither the co·rpora-
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tion itself nor any of such a corporation's usual and ordinary rights and powers are subject to collateral attack in
such a proceeding as this.
The appellant has not shown, or attempted to show,
in any way, why, under this provision of the statute, the
plaintiff and respondent should not now be authorized to
prosecute this condemnation action. The statute in plain
terms gives it that porwer, regardless of any argument on
behalf of counsel with respect to officers, agents, conductors, etc., or whether or not it is a common carrier. It
cannot be disputed that the property owned and held by it
is being used for railroad purposes and for purposes of
performing the duties of a common carrier ~and is so being
used under contract by the lessee as "substitute or agent"
for and on behalf of the lessor. We call attention to the
provisions of paragraph 8 of the lease which provides that
the contract may be terminated on short notice. The lessor,
under the laws already quoted, cannot relieve itself of the
duties and obligations which are imposed upon it under its
franchise as a corporation, and in addition to those duties
and the possibility that the lease can be and may have to
be cancelled on short notice, whereby the respondent would
resume full oper,ation, there are other provisions in the
lease which require certain duties· to be performed. currently,
either upon request of the lessee or otherwise, in connection with transfers of property, adjusting ac-counts, and
reimbursing lessee for costs of additions and betterments,
even to the extent of issuing new bonds. or other evidences
of indebtedness if that should be necessary. (See paragraph
7 of the lease as quoted hereinabove.)
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Counsel for appellant quotes and seems to place considerable reliance in his brief upon the case of In re N iaga,ra
Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429,
and on page 8 of his brief states :
"The court of appeals of New York has held
that a railroad corporation must be a common carrier * * * ''
That statement is not true. The question as to whether or
not the Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co. was. a common
carrier was not even ·raised or discussed in that case, and
the words "common carrier" were not even used therein.
The question as to whether or not such railroad was a common carrier was not the basis of a decision in that ease,
but the basis of opinion of the New York Court of Appeals
was that the use proposed by the Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co. was not a public use and therefore the railway
company was not entitled to condemnation. The New York
court did state that if the use is not a public use the question as to whether or not the railway company has assumed
in its articles of association the character of an ordinary
railway association is immaterial, but the question of the
nature of the railway corporation was not the issue involved in that case but the issue was as to whether or not
the use sought was a public use, and we wager that if the
Niagara Falls & WhirlP'ool Ry. Co. had been seeking to
build an ordinary railroad to transport freight traffic, or,
having some such railroad, if it had sought to build a spur
track or industrial lead as is involved here, we are sure
that the New York court of appeals would have held the
use to be a public use and the decision would have: been
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different than it was in that case. The question of whether
the use was public was not precluded by the fact that the
plaintiff was a railroad corporation. The same is true
here. The mere fact that the plaintiff is a railroad corporation, even under Section 77-0-5 ( 3), would not be sufficient to authorize plaintiff and respondent to condemn
if the use herein sought was not a public use because even
that fact only gives such a railroad corporation authority
to condemn "in the manner provided by law," and the law
relating to condemnation provides that the use must be
such as is considered to be a public use. It is interesting
to note that, while appellant quoted rather extensively from
the Niag·ara case, after italicising a portion, appellant left
out some of the text in his quote toward the bottom of page
10 of his brief, and the portion left out by appellant reads
as follows:
"What is a public use is incapable of exact definition. The expressions 'public interest' and 'public
use' are not synonymous .. "
The court then goes on to state :

"* * *

The ground upon which private
property may be taken for railroad uses, without
the ·consent of the owner, is primarily that railroads
are highways furnishing means of communication
between different points, promoting traffic and commerce, facilitating exchanges; in a word, they are
improved ways. In every form of government the
duty of providing public ways is acknowledged to be
a public duty. In this state the duty of laying out
and maintaining highways has, in the main, been
performed dir·ectly by the state or by local authorities; but, from an early day, the legislature has,
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from time to time, delegated to turnpike corporations the right and duty to maintain public roads
in localities, and canal companies have been organized with powers of eminent domain. It would be
impracticable, and contrary to our usages, for the
state to enter upon the business of constructing and
operating railroads, and, in analogy to the delegation of the power of eminent domain to turnpike and
canal companies, it wisely delegates to corporate
bodies the right to construct and maintain railroads
as public ways for the transportation of freight and
passengers, and, as incident thereto, the right to
take private property under the power of eminent
domain on making compensation. * * *"
Thus, the issue in the Niagara case was not as to the nature
of the corporation itself because appellee, the Niagara
company, in its organization had qualified in that respect,
but the question was whether or not the use was a public
use. And the court in that case concluded that:
"The fact that the road of the petitioner may
enable the portion of the public who visit Niagara
falls more easily or more fully to gratify their curiosity, or that the road will be public in the sense
that all who desire will be entitled to be carried upon
it, is not sufficient, we think, in view of the other
necessary limitations, to make the enterprise a public one, so as to justify condemnation proceedings.
* * *"
On page 11 counsel for appellant quotes from E'lliott
on Railroads, Third Edition, Section 1204, and we admit
the statement there quoted as good law, but appellant does
not say and does not point out in the case at bar wherein
it might claim that the particular scheme in which plaintiff
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and respondent is here engaged is not a railroad enterprise
or that the taking is not for a public purpose but in the
final analysis appellant's argument is only that the plaintiff is not authorized to do the taking and, yet, he cites no
law to support such a proposition. Immediately preceding
the quotation which appellant takes from Section 1204 of
Elliott on Railroads, Third Edition, and the beginning of
Section 1204 reads :
"A railroad company which is charged with the
performance of the duties of a common carrier is,
as we have seen, so far a public enterprise that it
may be empowered to condemn the grounds needed
for the construction and maintenance of its line."
We have already referred to the fact that the respondent
herein is, not only by law but by our state constitution,
charged with the performance of these public duties and
cannot evade them by lease or otherwise, and, of course,
there was no intent to evade them by the lease.

II.

UNDER THE UTAH STATUTES AND CASES
THE TAKING MUST BE FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE.
We are surprised at appellant's counsel in setting forth
such a heading for argument or in attempting to argue on
such a point. We have already referred to the eminent
domain statute and agree that it is the use that is important and that use must be a public use. We wish to point
out to the court that in the findings of fact, by finding No.
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22 ( R. 54, 55) , the trial court found that "the use to which
plaintiff intends to put said property hereby sought to be
condemned is a public use authorized to plaintiff by law
and the right sought hereby is necessary to such use''. By
its conclusions of law, conclusion No. 3 (R. 56), the trial
court concluded: "That the use to which plaintiff proposes
to apply the property and right of way sought herein is a
public use and is authorized by law." The appellant has
not, either in its "Statement of Points Upon Which Appellant Will Rely," as served immediately subsequent to the
Notice of Appeal, nor anywhere in its brief or argument,
attacked such finding and ·conclusion of the court, nor in
any way attempted to point out wherein such a finding or
conclusion would not be substantiated by the evidence, if
it is plaintiff's claim that it was not so substantiated. In· its
"Designation of P·ortions of the Record, Proceedings and
Evidence to be Contained in Record on Appeal," the appellant did not request that there be included in the record
and ·certified to this court any of the evidence given by
public witnesses owning property in the area involved who
testified that they needed the trackage, wanted the trackage, and had requested that the trackage be extended into
the area for their benefit and that the trackage when extended would be contiguous to and serve their properties.
For this reason the appellant has not properly ·certified
to nor brought to this court the question as to whether or
not the use proposed by plaintiff and respondent was or
was not a public use and has in no manner attacked the
court's findings or conclusions or the evidence upon such
subject.
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In its. Statement of Points (R. 72, 73), and as repeated
on pages 3 and 4 of its brief, the appellant contended that
plaintiff and respondent was not a common carrier, that
the district court should have found that it was not engaged in the rendering of public service, and that the district court should have concluded, therefore, that plaintiff
and respondent was not entitled to condemn and that therefore the judgment is against law because respondent is
not engaged in the rendition of any public s·ervice. THERE
IS NO Q:UES:TION WHATSO·EVER RAISED AS TO
WHET'HER OR NOT THE USE PROPOSED BY PLAINTIFF WAS F'OR A PUBLIC PURPOSE, OR WHETHER
SUCH PROPOSED USE WAS OR WAS NOT A PUBLIC
USE.
We do not wish to waive our right to object to this
failure on the part of appellant to properly present such
question to this court on appeal, but we cannot see the
materiality nor the reason for the citing and quoting from
the cases referred to by counsel on pages 11 to 17, inclusive,
of his brief. We do not wish to allow the matter to go unchallenged for that reason, and we will therefore make
brief reference to some of the cases. which may bear upon
such subject. We feel that we do not need to go to any
jurisdiction outside the State of Utah because this court
has on numerous occasions gone into considerable detail
as. to what may or may not be considered as. a public use
within our Utah statutes. Counsel cites. and quotes, on
page 12. of his brief, from the cases, Cereghino v. O~egon
Short LineR. Co., 26 Utah 467, 73 P. 634, and Stockdale v.
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 201, 77 P. 849.
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Neither of such cases was a condemnation case but they
arose on injunction proceedings in such a way that they
can be directly applied. The· Cereghino case was first in
time, and in that case the Short Line sought to extend a
track to serve the Con. Wagon & Machine Company. It was
admitted that only the one industry could or would be
served, and therefore the court held that the spur track
was for the convenience and accommodation of a private
business. The Rio Grande learned a lesson from the Cereghino case, and in the Stockdale case, while the evidence
seemed to point rather conclusively to the fact that the
only industry that was available or could be served by the
Rio Grande spur was the brewing company, nevertheless
the Rio Grande produced testimony that it would serve
anyone who applied and the spur would be available to
all and, thus, being open to the public generally, the court
held that it was a public use and, as quoted by counsel,
the court stated that if all persons and business institutions
which may have occasion to do so, be permitted to use it
and the track will be open to the public use generally, "if
so then it is a public utility". Again we state that the
evidence in this case did show much more strongly than
was shown in the Stockdale case that it will be open to the
use by the public generally. Nevertheless, counsel for appe~
lant did· not see fit to certify to this court the evidence that
would so show. There were a number of witnesses who
appeared and testified that they had requested that this
trackage be extended into this area to serve their properties, and the evidence was that it would serve all property
owners in the area or all who sought service from it. There ·.
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were other witnesses in addition to the same witnesses who
appeared before the Public Service Commission of Utah
in 'Case No. 7597, entitled, D'enver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad c·ompany v. Public· Service Commission of Utah
and Union Pacific Railroad Company, 230 P. 2d 5S7, wherein this court held that the Public Service ·Commission had
rightly found that public convenience and necessity existed
sufficient to warrant the action taken by the Commission
in that case. W·e wonder if appellant by inference does
intend to argue that the trial court erred in its finding and
conclusion that the use involved herein was a public use.
If so, why did not counsel attack the finding and the conclusion and refer to the evidence if the evidence did not
support such finding and conclusion, and why did he not
designate and request all evidence· be certified to this court
if he· intended to argue on such a point?
If counsel intends to base his argument solely on the
lack of power or authority in plaintiff to prosecute condemnation actions, we have no quarrel with him as far as
the record he has brought to this, court is concerned, but
on that question we think the· issue is not what the articles
of incorporation may show and not whether or not the
plaintiff and respondent is a common carrier, but does
plaintiff and respondent have the right to ·condemn. We
insist that the plaintiff is a railroad corporation under the
act contained in Title 77 of our statutes and that, beyond
that, the defendant and appellant cannot launch any collateral attack upon the rights. of the plaintiff corporation
as such and the sole question then would be whether or
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not the plaintiff, having leased its properties, can nevertheless still prosecute an action in condemnation.
In the case of Apex Tra.nsportation Co. v. Garbade,
32 Ore. 582, 52 P. 573, cited by counsel on page 16 of his
brief, there is the statement that no declaration of the
objects and purposes of a company in its charter can aid
it in a condemnation case. We again call attention to the
fact that in such case the only question involved was
whether the use proposed was a public use, and we admit,
and will reiterate, as was true in the case of Niagar'a. Falls
Whirlpool Ry. Co., if the use proposed is not a public· us:e,
nothing contained in the articles or charter of a company
can aid the corporation in taking the property sought. But
the question thus involved is the question of public use
and not the question as to the authority or power of the
corporation, and if the use proposed is a public use authorized by law and if the corporation is one having right by
law to prosecute condemnation, then the Niagarra, case and
Apex Tra.nsporta.tion case and others cited by counsel can
have no application.
In the Apex Transport·ation Co. v. Garbade case, the
company was organized to construct a skid road but the
court found that the principal portion of its road had not
even been surveyed or definitely located and that over the
portion in question "when constructed the only practical
use to which it can be put will be the transportation of logs
for this mill company, and for no other, * * *." Thus,
the question at issue there was a question as to whether
or not the use proposed was a public use and not whether
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the transportation company was entitled to condemn otherwise.
In Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 P.
681, a logging road was held not to be a public use on the
basis that the law providing that such logging road would
be a public use was unconstitutional under a constitutional
provision which stated :
"Whenever an attempt is made to take private
property for a use alleged to be public, the question
whether the contemplated use be really public shall
be a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use
is public."
The court in that case found:
"An examination of all the different constitutions in the union shows that only two other states,
viz., Colorado and Missouri, have the provision of
our constitution * * *."
Again we say, however, that the holding of the court was
that the use was not a public use.
In the case of Ama.dor·Queen Mining· Co. v. DeWitt, 73
Cal. 482., 15 P. 7 4, the plaintiff tried to condemn a right of
way through defendant's tunnel and was denied that right
by the California court. We do not believe that such a holding would be followed by the California court today. Nevertheless, regardless of that fact, such case is exactly contrary to the case of Montaire Mining Co. v. Columbus
Rex·all Consolidated Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172,
wherein the plaintiff sought and was granted the right of
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condemnation to use jointly \vith defendant a tunnel owned
by defendant. In that case this court stated:
"We think it is generally agreed that where the
right of eminent domain is granted for a particular
purpose, then the statute must be given a libe·ral
construction in furtherance of such purpose."
The case of Hercules TT"ater Co. v. Fernandez, 5 ·Cal.
App. 726, 91 P. 401, involved again a question as to 'vhether
the use was a public use, and the condemnor in that case
did not comply with the statute but tried to broaden the
purposes as stated in the statute.

Sutter v. Nicols, 152 ·Cal. 688, 9-3 P. 872, was not a
condemnation case but a case where one operating a mine
was enjoined from dumping tailings and refuse in a stream,
causing the stream to overflow on plaintiff's land.
The case of Stratford Irrigation District v. Empire
Water Co., 111 P. 2d 957, 44 Cal. App. 61, takes a more
liberal view than earlier cases, and that case states, similar to what we have hereinabove quoted from the Montaire
Mining case, as follows:
"It has been held that where the legislature declares a particular use to be a public use the presumption is in favor of its declaration and the courts will
not interfere therewith unless the use is clearly and
manifestly of a private character."
We wish to refer
as to whether or not
respondent is a public
cases cited by counsel

again to the fact that the question
the use proposed by plaintiff and
use is not before this court and the
have been cited apparently to sup-
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port the proposition that a proposed use cannot be aided
by any declaration of the objects and purposes stated in
the ·charter of the company or by any legislative act. We
did and do agree with that statement, and we are not trying, and did not try in the trial court, to prove that the
use proposed by plaintiff and respondent was a public use
by reference to plaintiff's articles of incorporation or anything of a similar nature. The court found and concluded
that the use proposed by plaintiff was a public use and
such finding is not assailed, and the only point that appellant has raised or can raise in connection therewith is
appellant's argument that plaintiff, having leased its line,
is not entitled to file condemnation.
With respect to the question of public use, however,
we do wish to refer briefly to the following cases, in addition to the Stockdale and Cereghino cases cited by counsel.

Nash v. Clwrk, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371. This was a suit
by one man to condemn a right of way to enlarge and use
an irrigation ditch, and the sole question was whether this
was a public use. The holding of this court is enlightening
with respect thereto:
"There is no fixed rule of law by which this
question can be determined. In other words, what
is a public use cannot always be determined by the
application of purely legal principles. This is evident from the fact that there are two lines of authorities, neither of which attempts to lay down any
fixed rules as a guide to be followed in all cases.
One class of authorities in a general way, holds
that by public use is meant a use by the public or
its agencies-that is, the public must have the right
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to the actual use in some way of the property appropriated; whereas, the other line of decisions
holds that it is a public use within the meaning of
the law when the taking is for a use that will promote the public interest and which use tends to develop the great natural resources of the commonwealth. After a careful examination of the leading
cases on this subject we are of the opinion that the
class of decisions last mentioned are more in harmony with enlightened public policy, and the liberal
interpretation given the term 'public use' which the
legislature has, in effect, declared shall be followed
in this state, is far more conducive to individual and
public advancement than the restricted construction
adopted and followed by the line of decisions first
referred to."
This case was affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United
States in Ncwh v. Clark, 19'8 U. S. 361, 49 L. Ed. 1085, 25
S. Ct. 676. See, also, Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co.,
200 U. S. 527, 50 L. Ed. 581, 26 S. Ct. 301, wherein the
Strickley case referred to by appellant was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of the United States. See, also, Town
of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P. 2'd 343; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 2'3 Utah 474, 65 P. 735.

Butte A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Montana U. Ry. Co. (Mont.),
41 P. 232. Plaintiff railroad sought to condemn portions
of defendant's right of way not actually possessed and used
by defendant to provide an extension for plaintiff's road
and for spurs to mines in the Butte area. There were
several crossings of the defendant road involved. We quote
from the opinion of the Montana Supreme Court:
"It is well established that if, in point of law,
a use is public, the fact that not many persons will
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enjoy the use is not material * * *. The character of a way, whether it is public or private, is
determined by the extent of the right to use it and
not by the extent to which that right is exercised.
If all the people have the right to use it, it is a
public way, although the number who have occasion
to exercise the right is very small * * *. The
·circumstance that the plaintiff road was built by a
private corporation and that its bra~ches are not
within convenient contiguity of private mines or
ore houses, does not materially affect the road and
give a private character to its use or to the use of
its spurs. All termini of tracks and switches are
more or less beneficial to private parties, but the
public character of the use of the tracks is never
affected by this. 'It may be in such cases that it is
expected, or even that it is intended, that such tracks
will be used almost entirely by the manufacturer;
yet if there is no exclusion of an equal right of use
by others and the singleness of use is simply theresult of location and convenience of access, it cannot affect the question' · * * *."

See, also, CottreU v. Chicago T. H. & S. E. Ry. Co.
(Ind.), 13.S N. E. 504; Westp·ort Stone Co. v. Thomas (Ind.),
94 N. E. 406; Pioneer Coal Co. v. Cherry Tree & Dixon'IJille
R. Co. (Pa.), 116 A. 45; Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v.
Ammons (Tex.), 215 S. W. 2d 407. These cases are in
accord with the Stockdale: case and other Utah cases hereinabove cited.
III.
A RAILROAD COMPANY CANNOT CONDEMN
LAND FOR USES ·NOT CONNECTED WITH
THE CONDUCT' OF ITS BUSINESS OR REMOTE FROM PROPERTIES OWNED BY IT.
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Under this heading appellant has cited one or two
cases but has not attempted to point out how any of the
authorities apply to the case at bar. We admit that the
Short Line could not condemn property for a right of wa:y
which was not connected with its tracks nor with the business transacted over its tracks by its lessee, the Union
Pacific. It is the Short Line that owns the tracks and the
property with which the industry track connection in question will be made, and it is the Short Line's business being
conducted by its lessee that would be affected by the track
in question.
See McPhee & McGinnity Co. v. Union Pacific R·. Co.
(Colo), 158 F. 5. The city of Denver granted a franchise
or license to the Union Pacific to construct a s.pur track
along Blake Street in Denver to a proposed area where industries and warehouses were to be built but were not
yet located in the area. The franchise along Blake Street
ran from 19th to 27th Streets. Plaintiffs were owners of
property fronting on the street and sought to enjoin the
construction of the railroad spur on the basis that it was
purely a private enterprise and not a public use. We quote
from the opinion:
"This railroad company had an established line
of railroad through the city of Denver and the tTacks
upon Blake Street authorized by the ordinance were
spur tracks from its main track for the benefit of
parties who expected to build warehouses on vacant
property abutting on that street * * *"
"The suggestion that the license was. unauthorized because the tracks were not for public but for
private use· cannot prevail. In a sense every spur to
'
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a private warehouse, manufacturing or trading establishment, is for private us-e of those who own and
conduct the business therein but in a larger sense
and in the true sense every such railroad track is
for the public use and for the public benefit, because
it enables the public to exchange its commodities for
those of the parties who conduct their business upon
the track in a more facile and economical way. It reduces the price of the articles. carried to the consumer and it increases commerce."
It will be noted that the federal court in this Colorado
case referred to the fact that the Union Pacific "had an
established line of railroad through the city of Denver'' and
that the proposed tracks "were spur tracks from its main
track." The Union Pacific does not own the railroad in
question here. The Short Line owns the main line track
from which the proposed spur would extend and owns the
properties involved from McCammon, Idaho, on the north
to Sandy, Utah, south of Salt Lake. The Union Pacific
owns a line of railroad in its own right and not as lessee,
extending east from Ogden, Utah, but only operates the
properties in question here for the Short Line under lease.
We are definitely certain that if a condemnation action
had been filed in the name of the Union Pacific, wherein
the Union Pacific itself had sought to condemn a right of
way for trackage anywhere in the Salt Lake area, the defendant would have immediately protested that "a railroad
company cannot condemn land for uses not connected with
the conduct of its business as a common carrier," and that
the Union Pacific had no railroad in the Salt Lake area and
was not entitled in any manner to condemn property for
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railroad purposes in the Salt Lake City area. It would be
the same as if either the Union Pacific or the Short Line
had attempted to condemn land somewhere in Carbon
County, Utah. Neither has any railroad properties or conducts railroad business there, and neither would have the
right to condemnation of property any,vhere in Carbon
County, even though they may attempt to allege that such
condemnation was for railroad purposes or other public
uses.
In the case at bar, however, the properties are properties of the Short Line and are operated for the Short
Line by the Union Pacific by virtue of the lease, and authorities which state that a railroad company cannot condemn land for uses not connected with the conduct of its
business are not in point. The cases cited on pages 18 and
19 of counsel's brief refer to property needed for construction of dwellings for employes and property desired for
a park. These cases clearly cannot be in point and appellant
has not cited any case that would be in point upon its argument with respect to common carrier, ·or otherwise.

IV.
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT BY LEASING
ITS PROPERTIES TO THE UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY DID NOT LOSE ITS
RIGHT TO CONDEMN, AND PLAINTIFF AND
RESPONDENT DOES HAVE POWER AND
AUTHORITY TO BRING AND PROSECUTE
THIS CONDEMNATION ACTION.
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As we have heretofore set forth, this point No. IV is
one posed by respondent and not by appellant but, in our
opinion, is the real point at issue and the issue upon which
appellant's counsel performed the major burden of his
labors as far as the trial court is concerned. Throughout
the trial of this. case counsel for appellant has insisted and
repeated that plaintiff and respondent is not a common
carrier, it is not a railroad company, it does not perform
the duties of a railroad, it has disposed of all its property
by lease and therefore is not entitled to condemnation. The
major portion of what counsel has otherwise argued in
appellant's brief tends only to cloud the issues. We have
already stated and quoted authority herein to show that
the plaintiff and respondent is a common carrier; that the
railroad transportation being performed by Union Pacific
is being performed by that company for and. on behalf of
the lessor, ·the Short Line.
We have heretofore quoted provisions of Section 77-0-5,
Utah Code Annotated, 19'43, which sets forth that, in addition to rights, privileges and powers held. by ordinary corporations "such railroad corporations shall have the following powers," and then sets forth 14 separate subparagraphs
of additional powers. We have quoted the provisions of
Section 77-0-5·(3), which give the right and power to a
railroad corporation, under the laws of Utah, to condemn
property for a right of way. Subparagraph (9) of that same
Section 77-0-5 provides that .such a "railroad corporation
organized under the laws of this state" shall also have the
right and power
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"to lease, sell, convey and transfer its property and
franchises or any part thereof to any railroad corporation not owning any competitive line in this
state * * *."
If a railroad corporation such as is referred to in that
section ceases to be such a railroad corporation with the
powers therein enumerated when it leases its property, as is
the contention of appellant, THEN SUCH A RAILROAD
CORPORATION DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER T'O
LEASE AND THE STATUTE THUS GIVING IT THAT
RIGHT WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE AND AN ABSOLUTE NULLIT·Y. If a railroad corporation organized
under the laws of the State of Utah is by the same law and
the same section given the right to prosecute actions in
condemnation and also given the right to lease its properties,
then it cannot be argued that if such a corporation does lease
its properties it is no longer a railroad corporation entitled
to condemnation. We think that this statute in and of itself
is a complete and entirely sufficient answer to the contention
of appellant herein. Nevertheless, the authorities are quite
numerous which go to support the position taken by plaintiff and respondent and which are, without dispute or dissent, opposed to and directly contrary to the position taken
by the defendant and appellant herein.
Elliott on Railroads, Third Edition, Volume 2, Section
1202, page 706. Right to Condemnation where road is
leased:
"Right to condemn where road is leased or in
hands of a receiver.-It is said that personal rights
and privileges granted to a corporation can only be
exercised by its board of directors or other govern-
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ing body. The power of eminent domain is granted as
a personal trust, and can not be delegated or transferred without legislative sanction; accordingly, it
is held that neither the purchasers, nor the lessees,
of a railroad can exercise the right without express
authority. And, where its road can not be succe·ssfully operated without the acquisition of the property sought to be ·condemned, a company which has
leased all its. property and franchises may exercise
the right of eminent domain, even though the lease
is for the entre life of the corporation and the property is taken solely for the use of the lessee. It has
been held that a railroad company, leasing the property and franchises of another, the corporate identity
of the lessor being maintained, may exercise the power of the lessor to widen its roadbed, though the exercise of the power is practically for the benefit of
the lessee. * * *"

In re New York L. & W. R. Co. v. Union Steamboat Co·.,
1 N. E. 27. The plaintiff sought to condemn land for railroad purposes. However, the plaintiff did not operate its
road but the road was operated under a lease by another
company. We quote from the opinion:
"It is further objected that the petitioner has
lost its right to condemn lands by reason of its lease
for the full period of its corporate life to the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, a
corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. We do not understand that the validity of this
lease, as between the contracting parties, is seriously questioned. * * * It must be treated as valid
for the purpose of the objection, since, if invalid, the
question raised practically disappears. The ground
insisted upon is that the lessor company, having
parted with the entire control of its road for the full
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period of its existence, cannot longer be said to require any additional lands for its purposes, but such
land could only be required for the purposes. of the
lessee.
e are to observe precisely what the question
is. If it is a legal possibility that the lessor company
could need or require the property for its corporate
uses, the question of fact whether in truth it did so
need it was litigated and decided on the evidence
favorably to the petitioner, and with sufficient reason. But the contention here is, as matter of law,
that such necessity could not by possibility survive
the lease. Upon that point we think the case of Kip
v. New York & H. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 227, should control our conclusion. There the lessor company had
instituted proceedings for the condemnation of land.
During the pendency of such proceedings it leased
its road to another company, and all its rights, franchises, and privileges, for the term of 401 years.
Thereafter the land-owner brought an action to restrain the further prosecution of the condemnation
proceedings, upon the precise ground taken here,
that, because of the lease, the lessor company could
not possibly need or require under the law the property sought.

''r

"The decision was adverse to that contention.
The court said that the same necessity existed after
as before the lease, 'and it is legally appropriate to
affirm that it exists in favor of the defendant, notwithstanding the lease.' The appellant's criticism
upon that case is that both parties were domestic
corporations, and here one is not. That is immaterial
to the inquiry. If the lease here is valid, the debated
question is the same; and whether the lessee company
is a foreign corporation or not is of no consequence,
for such lessee is not here seeking to condemn lands
for itself. If the lease is void, then the lessor company stands like any other domestic railroad company seeking to acquire lands for its own purposes.
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If any justification of the case cited is needed, it may
be found in the fact that section 21 of the railroad act,
as amended many times., evidently contemplates the
acquisition of lands by companies which have leased
their roads, and in the further consideration that,
by its lease, the lessor company in no· respect escapes
from or lessens its corporate duty to the state, but is
continuilng the performance of that duty through the
agency of its lessee, and may at any time, through
the failure of the latter to perform its covenant obligations., or by its absolute loss. of corporate life and
existence, become repossessed of its line and property, and bound to operate it for itself; and that, to
the proper performance of its duty by itself, or
through its lessee, the acquisition of lands or terminal
facilities. may be necessary and essential."

Dietricks v. L. & N. W. R. Co. (Neb.), 13 N. W. 624.
Defendant filed condemnation proceedings. to secure property for depot and yard purposes in the city of Columbus,
Nebraska. The plaintiff then filed this case, seeking an injunction against defendant to block the condemnation proceedings. It was shown that the defendant's. lines and property were all leas.ed to the Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co., and it
was contended that, therefore, the L. & N. W. Co. had no
right to condemn. Incidentally, in that case it was argued
that proper officers of that company had not authorized the
proceedings. The trial court denied the injunction and the
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. We quote from the
opinion:
"It is also urged that certain testimony given by
the witness Post as. to what was done and said by E.
A. Touzalin, the general manager of the company, in
directing the location of the tracks and depot grounds,
and as to the necessity of taking this lot, ought to
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have been excluded. Much of this testin1ony was admitted without objection: but even that which was
not, was clearly admissible under the pleadings,
especially in view of the charge made in the petition
that the proceedings in condemnation were not di.rected by any competent authority, but by persons
whose only relations to the company was merely that
of attorneys at law. * * *. We are of opinion
that, in the location of depot and other grounds of a
railroad company, and in fixing their extent, the decision of the general manager of the company, who,
as this official designation fairly implies, and the
evidence clearly shows, 'had charge of all its business,' including the construction of its road and
buildings, is prima facie, and, in the absence of all
evidence to the contrary, a just measure of what is
essential to the convenient and proper conduct of its
business, and sufficient to warrant the exercise of
the power of eminent domain in its behalf. * * *"

*

*

*

*

*

"It appears that the defendant company, prior
to the commencement of the proceedings to condemn
this lot, had, by lease for a term of years, transferred
to another company 'all of the property and franchises' which it then owned or might thereafter
acquire. This lease, it is urged, had the effect to deprive the defendant of the right, even if it would
otherwise have had it, to exercise the power of
eminent domain, and that therefore the finding of
the referee in this respect was erroneous. We think
this objection is untenable. The leas.e expressly provides that the defendant shall 'do and perform any
and every corporate act which may be necessary, useful, or appropriate to secure to' its lessee 'the full enjoyment of * * * every franchise, right, easement, power, and privilege' which it then possessed
or might thereafter acquire; and that it would also,
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to this end, maintain its corporate organization. The
condemnation of this lot for the purpose of the company is certainly a corporate act, and, if essential to
the convenient and proper use of its road by the
lessee, is one which, by the terms of the lease, the defendant was bound to perform upon request. And,
besides, there is no authority for proceeding in any
other name than that of the defendant company."

Lower v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. (Iowa), 13 N. W.
718. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. was seeking
property to double track its line through a portion of Iowa. A
question was raised as to its power to condemn, inasmuch
as it was, a foreign corporation and not an Iowa corporation. It caused to be formed under the laws of Iowa the
Chillicothe & Sheriton R. R. Co., which then brought the
condemnation. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against
both railroads. It appeared that the new Iowa corporation
adopted a survey already made by the Chi. B. & Q., and it
was shown that the new company had leased the new road
in question to the Chi. B. & Q., and the Burlington was doing
the actual construction of the road. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment. We quote from the opinion:

"A corporation has all the power expressed in
its articles of incorporation or charter, and all other
powers reasonably incident to the exercise of the
expressed powers, unless restricted by some statute
or rule of law. * * *

"*

* * If, then, the Chicago B. &

Q. R. R.

Co. lacks the power to build such road * * * the
Chillicothe & Sheriton R. R. Co. can build the road
and that, too, even though it derives all its. means
from the Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. and builds it
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with the express design of leasing it to that company.''

State v. Superior Court (Wash.), 72 P. 89. The Seattle
& Montana Railroad Company was a railroad corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Washington. It
sought to condemn lands "for the purpose of tracks and a
cite for terminal buildings and facilities." This Seattle
company did not actually operate its properties but they were
operated under lease by the Great Northern Railway Company. The public service commission authorized condemnation, and the owners of the land involved brought the matter
to the Supreme Court by certiorari. The Washington
Supreme Court stated :

"* * * we think the petitioner also satisfactorily proved that the premises were required
and necessary for the purposes specified, namely, a
right of way for its tracks and a site for a passenger
station and for platforms, warehouses, etc. But it
was shown by the testimony of the petitioner's
engineer that the petitioner is not the owner of
any locomotives or cars, and that it does not operate
its railroad, but the same is operated by the Great
Northern Railway Company, under some kind of
an agreement between them, the terms of which
were not disclosed by the evidence. * * *''
In spite of the objection of the property owners, the trial
court found that the contemplated use was a public use and
that the Seattle company was entitled to proceed with the
condemnation. In confirming the trial court, the Washingon Supreme Court said:
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"It is also objected that the respondent the
Seattle & Montana Railroad Company has no right
to condemn this property for the purposes indicated
in its petition, because it appears from the evidence
that it has no rolling stock of its own, does not
operate its road, and does and will permit the Great
Northern Railway Company and other railroad
companies to run their passenger and freight trains
over its line into Seattle, and to use its depot and
terminal grounds there situated. In other words, it
seems to be claimed that the proof shows that the
respondent company is seeking, through the exercise
of the power of eminent domain, to take the property
of these realtors not for its own us.e and benefit, but
for the use and benefit of other corporations. We
think this objection is wholly untenable. Under what
agreement or understanding between the two companies the respondent's railroad is used and operated
by the Great Northern Railway Company, or upon
what terms and conditions the cars of other railroad
companies are or may be transported over its road,
is not disclosed by the evidence; but, whatever the
arrangement is under which this may be done, it
cannot be presumed to be illegal. Indeed, it is not
only the right, but the duty, of the Seattle & Mon-

tana Railroad Company, under the law and the Constitution of this state, to permit such use of its road
by other railroad compan~es. Ballinger's Ann. Codes
& St. Sec. 4318; Const. art. 12, Sec. 13. And, if it be
true that said company has leas-ed its railroad to the
Great Northern Company, or any other company or
companies, or agreed to do so, it is not thereby precluded from condemning and appropriating private
property for a public use, which may be necessary for
its tracks, side tracks, depots, etc. In re Metropolitan
E. Ry. Co., supra; Crolley v. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 541,
16 N. W. 422; Mayor v. Railway Co., 109 Mass. 103;
in reNew York, etc., R. Co., 99 N.Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27;
I
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Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 113 Ill. 156. In
Re Metropolitan Ry. Co., supra, it was objected that
the condemnation proceedings could not be maintained by the petitioner bec.ause of the lease of its
line of road to another company. Concerning the objection the court said: 'This object ion is not well
founded, beca.use it ha.s been repea.tedly decided that
the leasing of a. line of railu'ay corpo1·a.tion to another
corporation does not deprive the for1ner of the power
to exercise the right of e1ninent domain.' The Illinois
case above cited ( 113 Ill. 156) is an interesting and
instructive one, and is directly in point here, especially on the question of the power of a lessor railroad
company to condemn private property for corporate
purposes. In that case, as in this, the company seeking to appropriate the property did not own any cars
or locomotives, and did not transport passengers or
freight, and had leased its line to other companies,
and yet the court there held that it was not thereby
deprived of the right to take property under the
power of eminent domain."
Beckman v. Lincoln & N. W. R. Co. (Neb.), 112 N. W.
348. The defendant railroad company had instituted condemnation proceedings in the county court against plaintiff.
The county court had granted condemnation and given
possession, and that case was appealed to the district court.
While there pending on appeal, the plaintiff sued separately
in the district court and secured an injunction against further proceedings in the condemnation action and against
further construction by the railroad. It appeared that the
defendant railroad company was incorporated in 1879 to
construct a railroad from Lincoln to Columbus, Nebraska,
and thence to the north boundary of the state. It constructed
the road from Lincoln to Columbus and the next year leased
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its right of way and all of its property and franchises to the
Burlington & Missouri River Ry. Co. for a period of 999
years.. Thereafter, the Chicago, Burlington & Q. R. R. Co.
purchased the road and properties of the Burlington &
Missouri River Ry. Co., including the long-term lease of the
defendant company. The properties of the defendant company were being operated by the Burlington under the lease
at the time of the condemnation proceedings.
On the appeal in the injunction suit the defendant railroad company contended that the plaintiff was not entitled
to the relief by injunction but could only seek quo warranto.
The supreme court did not agree with that contention, saying
the plaintiff could proceed in equity because it could no·t question the railroad company's right in the condemnation proceedings. We quote from the opinion:

"* * * An appeal to the district court does
not vacate or supersede the proceedings in the county
court so as to prevent the railroad company from
proceeding with the construction of its road upon the
land, which may be completed and the road in operation before the matter is finally heard in the district
court. Any relief that the district court might then
afford cannot be said to he adequate. On the other
hand, it is equally clear that the corporate existence
of the defendant cannot be attacked, nor its right to
exist and exercise its corporate franchises. challenged,
by a private individual in this form of action."
"The contention of the plaintiff is, in substance,
that the defendant is not engaged in the construction
of the line which crosses his land, but that the same is
being constructed by the Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Company for its own use and benefit; that the nearest point on defendant's line of
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railroad is more than two miles from his premises;
and that the condemnation proceedings. are not prosecuted in good faith for the proper use of the defendant, and are in fraud of plaintiff's rights. The contention of the plaintiff that 'a railroad company cannot use its powers of eminent domain to acquire a
right of way for another company's road' is manifestly right. * * * It clearly has no authority
to take land for the use of another company in the
construction of the road of the latter. No one would
contend that this defendant company could go into
a distant county of the state and condemn land for
the construction of a road in which it would have
no interest when constructed, a road that would be
the property of another company and used exclusively by that other company. The Lincoln & Northwestern Railway Company may condemn land necessary
for the construction of its road, but it cannot condemn land for the construction of a road by and for
the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company,
or any other company; and the principal question in
this case is whether this land is being taken for the
construction of the road of the defendant in this
action, or whether it is in fact being taken for the
construction of the road of the Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad Company."
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the road was
the road of the defendant being built by it and reversed the
trial court and dismissed the injunction. In connection with
this case we wish to call the court's attention to the fact, as
stated herein, that "a railroad company cannot use its
powers of eminent domain to acquire a right of way for another company's road." Therefore, the Union Pacific could
not file and maintain an action to acquire a right of way
which would become a part of the road owned by the Short
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Line. The Union Pacific does not own the railroad properties
involved herein and owns only the line of railroad extending
east from Ogden, and we are sure that under this case and
other similar law neither the Union Pacific nor anyone else
"could go into a distant county of the state and condemn
land for the construction of a road in which it would have
no interest when constructed." Under the very terms of the
lease itself, all "such additions, betterments and extensions
made upon or to any part of the demised premises owned by
the Lessor shall become and be a part of the demised premises
and the property of the Lessor, and the Lessor shall reimburse the Lessee to the extent of the cost incurred by it
therefor, chargeable to property investment accounts." The
Short Line owns the railroad and will own the industry spur
sought to be added here and is entitled to condemn and the
one who should condemn.

Riden v. Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R. Co.
( Md.), 35 A, 2d 99. The plaintiff sought to restrain and enjoin the defendant from condemning his land for a spur
track to the Bowie race track. The defendant had leased
all of its. road and properties to the Pennsylvania Railroad
Company, which was operating them under such lease at the
time condemnation was filed. The Pennsylvania Railroad
Company did not have authority for eminent domain in the
State of Maryland, and plaintiff contended because of the
lease and the operation by the Pennsylvania Railroad that
the plaintiff no longer had the right to condemn. The Maryland Appellate Court held otherwise. We quote from the
court's opinion:
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''It is an accepted doctrine that the po,Yer of
eminent domain is inalienable, and any agency clothed by the State ,vith this sovereign power should hold
it as a public trust to be exercised \Vhenever publil'
necessity and convenience require it. It is accordingly held that any contract which attempts. to impair
the power of eminent domain is void as being contrary to public policy. Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Union
City, 137 Tenn. 491, 194 S. '""· 572; 18 Am. Jur.,
Eminent Domain, Sec. 25. It appears from the record in this case that the Philadelphia, Baltimore &
Washington Railroad Company, incorporated under
the laws of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Delaware,
leased its railroad lines and propel'ty to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, for the term of 999 years, beginning January
1, 1918. But the lessor expressly reserved its franchise and any other right or privilege which may be
necessary to preserve its corporate existence or
organization, and receives from the lessee an annual
rent suffj.cient to pay not only interest on bonds and
dividends on stock, but also organization, administration and legal expenses. Thus it maintains its corporate identity and is continuing to fulfill its obligations
to the State. It is evident that the lessor may find
it necessary at any time to resort to the power of
eminent domain in order to enlarge or improve the
railroad system or to meet exigencies growing out
of increased transportation. Under some circumstances it is conceivable that a loss of such power
might be destructive of important rights in the operation of the road, and might render the lease almost
valueless. In such an event the lessor would be unable to perform its. duty to the State. We therefore
conclude that, except in case of fraud, a domestic railroad corporation does not divest itself of the power
to condemn private property necessary for corporate
purposes by leasing its lines and property to another
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company, although the lessee itself may not have the
right as a foreign corporation to exercse the power
of eminent domain within this. State."
'

Robertson v. Brooksville & I. Ry. Co. (Fla.), 129 S. 582.
This case involved condemnation proceedings instituted by
the Brooksville & Inverness Ry. Corporation. The railroad
and all of the railroad properties of the plaintiff had been
leased to, and were being operated by, the Seaboard Airline
Railway Company. Upon the question of the right of condemnation being raised as a result of this lease, the Supreme
Court of Florida disposed of the matter with the following
short paragraph :
"It is well settled that a railroad company which
has leased all of its property and franchises. can exercise the right of eminent domain for the acquisition
of property necessary to the operation of the road by
its. lessee. Elliot on Railroads, Third Edition, Section
1212, and cases cited. And in New York it has been
held that this principle is applicable even where the
lease is for the period of the entire life of the corporation. Matter of N. Y., etc., R. Co., 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N.
E. 27."

Snyder v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co·. (Pa.), 60 A._151. The
Glenwood Railroad Company, a corporation organized under
the general railroad acts of Pennsylvania, leased its road and
properties to the Pittsburgh & Connelsville R. R. Co., also
a Pennsylvania corporation. The latter then leased its entire
road and properties, including the Glenwood lease, to the
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., a corporation of the State of Maryland.
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The Glenwood Railroad Company filed an action in condemnation to secure property for the purpose of widening
its road. It '\Vas contended that the Glenwood company did
not have the right to condemn nor was there any public
necessity sho,vn, inasmuch as the Glenwood company owned
no cars or motive po,Yer and had no need of increasing its
facilities. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the
right of the Glenwood company to prosecute an action in
condemnation. Among other things, the Supreme Court
said:
"Assuredly its power to so appropriate could not
be questioned if done for itself and it certainly does
not cease to exist because its exercise might operate
to the benefit of its lessees, who could properly request that the power be so exercised by the lessor to
meet the exigencies growing out of the increased
transportation." .
See, also, Terre Haute & P.R. Co. v. Robbins (Ill.), 93
N. E. 398, also a lease case, wherein it was contended that the
lessor did not have the right to condemn and wherein, also,
an attack was made upon the continued existence of the
lessor company, with respect to which the Illinois Supreme
Court said:
"In a proceeding for the condemnation of real
estate for railroad uses, the question of the de jure
existence of the company cannot be determined. It
is sufficient that the statute authorized the organization of the corporation, and that the petitioner is a
corporation de facto. Whether or not it has a legal
existence as a corporation can only be determined
by a direct proceeding-the writ of quo warranto.
* * *"
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"Railroad companies incorporated or organized
under the laws of this state have the power to make
contracts and arrangements with each other, and
with railroad corporations of other states, for leasing or renting their roads or any part thereof, and
also to contract for and hold in fee simple or otherwise, lands, or buildings in this or other states for
depot purposes * * *. Railroads may thus be
united and merged in a single line or two companies
may arrange for the joint use of the same tracks.
* * *. The contract between appellant and the
Illinois Central R. R. Co. for the use of the latter's
right of way and tracks between Maroa and Decatur
Junction executed on November 14, 1894, for the
period of 25 years, can be ended by either party on
one year's notice. * * *
"While it retained its. franchise, the question of
whether or not it was improperly exercising such
franchise· was one between it and the state. Any question of illegal combination or arrangement entered
into by it that might affect the franchise could only
be raised by the people in a proceeding instituted for
that purpose.''
We feel that that case has direct application to the case
at bar because the respondent company is a railroad company incorporated under the laws of this state and was
certified by the s.ecretary of state to be in good standing as
of the date of the trial.. Being such a railroad corporation in
good standing, it has, under the state laws, Section 77-0-5,
the right to prosecute an action in condemnation to secure
a right of way and also the right to lease its property or
otherwise contract with other companies for operation of
its road, just so long as the contract or lease is not with a
railroad owning a competing line. The question as to whether
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it is such a corporation, or 'vhether by its acts pursuant to
such law it has ceased to be the type of corporation therein
authorized, is something that cannot be attacked collaterally
in this condemnation action, but the question as to whether
it was or was not improperly exercising its franchise is one
between it and the state, and upon that basis alone the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
See, also, Pine .i.llartin Jlhdng Co. v. Empire Zinc Co.
(Colo.), 11 P. 2d 221; Peterson Orchard Co. v. Southwestern
Ark. Utilities Corp. (Ark.), 18 S. W. 2d 1028; Renter v.
Malin Water Co. (Ind.), 198 N. E. 442.
In the various arguments had in the trial court, commencing with the pretrial, counsel for plaintiff and respondent cited to the court and to opposing counsel and referred
to several of the cases herein cited and set forth wherein
railroad corporations, which had leased their properties
similar to what plaintiff and respondent has done here, were
nevertheless held to be entitled to prosecute condemnation
actions in their own names. In spite of the fact that this was
litigated as a major issue in the trial court and is really the·
issue here, and in spite of the fact that plaintiff and respondent cited such cases giving appellant's counsel access thereto, appellant has not seen fit to cite any contrary case, and
we therefore conclude that he has found none.

CONCLUSION
The statutes and laws of the State of Utah do not give
the right of condemnation to a common carrier, and nowhere
in those laws is it stated or even inferred that a corporation
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(or individual) must show itself to he a common carrier as
a prerequisite to entitle it to condemnation. Nevertheless,
we think it must be concluded in this case that the Oregon
Short Line Railroad Company is a common carrier, with its
property being handled by, and its duties as such common
carrier being performed by, the Union Pacific Railroad Company as substitute or agent for it pursuant to the lease contract, as so stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zachary,
232 U. S. 248, 58 L. Ed. 591, 34 S. Ct. 305. Also, the Constitution of the State of Utah makes it a common carrier and
places duties and responsibilities upon it as such and by
virtue of its state charter which it cannot escape by lease, or
otherwise, pursuant to constitutional mandate, and which
duties and responsibilities are in no manner lessened or relieved by its lease with the Union Pacific Railroad Company.
The Oregon Short Line Railroad Company is a railroad
corporation organized under the laws of this state and is
such a corporation in good standing under the laws of the
State of Utah, and as such is specifically given the power
and the authority to condemn, and by the same law and by
the same section given the right and authority to lease its
properties to a non-competitive railroad company.
The authorities, aside from our Utah statutes and state
constitution, are without dissent and are conclusive in holding that a railroad corporation, such as the plaintiff and
respondent herein, still retains its right to bring and prosecute actions in eminent domain, in spite of and after having
leased. its properties to another railroad company for operation, whether such lease is for one year and from year to
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year, as with the Short Line lease involved in this case, or
whether such lease is for the entire life of the corporation.
The property being condemned by plaintiff and respondent by virtue of the lease will become a part of the
property owned by the Short Line and is contiguous to such
Short Line properties and therefore could not be condemned
for it by any other corporation, and the use proposed and
for which the plaintiff and respondent sought the property
herein being condemned was and is a public use authorized
by law, and the trial court found and concluded that it was
a proper public use authorized by law, and the appellant has
not attacked said finding nor certified proper parts of the
record to this court in any frank attempt to show that the
trial court may have erred in such finding or conclusion.
Therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial court,
and the whole thereof, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRO·NSON,
A. U. MIN,ER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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